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ABSTRACT
Financial decisions about investing and saving for retirement are increasingly complex, requiring financial knowledge and confidence in that
knowledge. Few studies have examined whether direct assessments of individuals’ confidence are related to the outcomes of their financial
decisions. Here, we analyzed data from a national sample recruited through RAND’s American Life Panel, an Internet panel study of US
adults aged 18–88 years. We examined the relationship of confidence with self‐reported and actual financial decisions, using four different
tasks, each performed by overlapping samples of American Life Panel participants. The four tasks were designed by different researchers for
different purposes, using different methods to assess confidence. Yet, measures of confidence were correlated across tasks, and results were
consistent across methodologies. Confidence and knowledge showed only modest positive correlations. However, even after controlling for
actual knowledge, individuals with greater confidence were more likely to report financial planning for retirement and to successfully
minimize fees on a hypothetical investment task. Implications for the role of confidence in investment behavior (even if it is unjustified) is
discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Financial decisions about investing and saving for retirement
are increasingly complex, requiring financial knowledge and
confidence in that knowledge. However, few studies have
examined whether direct assessments of individuals’ confi-
dence, and its correspondence to actual knowledge, are
related to the outcomes they experience in life. Among those
that have been conducted, some suggest that a lack of
correspondence between confidence and knowledge is
associated with taking unwise risks, for example among
adolescents (Jaccard, Dodge, & Guilamo‐Ramos, 2005;
Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and among adults playing
blackjack (Stone, Rittmayer, & Parker, 2004). Perhaps as a
result of such risk taking, those displaying worse correspon-
dence between confidence and knowledge tend to experience
worse real‐world decision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin,
Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). Furthermore, in specific samples
of adults, overconfidence has been associated with worse
real‐world economic performance, with overconfident in-
vestors tending to trade more excessively and show worse
trading performance (Statman, Thorley, & Vorkink, 2006),
and overconfident chief financial officers tending to make
more risky investments, have more long‐term debt, and
make other seemingly inappropriate business decisions
(Ben‐David, Graham, & Harvey, 2007).
Although most of these studies suggest that inappropriate
confidence is related to negative outcomes, there may also be
real‐world situations in which confidence is beneficial,
whether or not it corresponds to actual knowledge or ability.
For example, even financial advisors who display extreme
confidence when making stock market predictions may be
preferred by customers over financial advisors who display
more appropriate levels of confidence, as compared with
their actual performance (Price & Stone, 2004). Having
confidence in one’s ability to control business risks that are
potentially uncontrollable may also increase managers’
willingness to take risks that provide the potential for
positive outcomes (March & Shapira, 1987). This study
examines the relationship of confidence, and its correspon-
dence with actual knowledge, with one area of financial
decision making—retirement planning.
Evaluating confidence
The appropriateness of confidence is typically evaluated in
comparison with knowledge, and several methodologies have
been used to evaluate this correspondence. One common
methodology involves asking respondents to answer a set of
true/false questions (e.g., “Alcohol causes dehydration”;
Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), expressing their confidence in
each answer, item by item, on a half‐range scale (50%= just
guessing, 100%= absolutely sure).1 Alternatively, respon-
dents may be asked to express their overall confidence by
providing one single estimate of the percent of items they
believe to have answered correctly. In each of these cases, the
1Other strategies for directly measuring knowledge and confidence include
“full‐range” assessments, where a single response represents the likelihood
of a statement being true or confidence interval assessments, where
bounds are selected such that they have a given likelihood of including a
focal value.
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most common metric is under/overconfidence, which is
represented by the difference between overall confidence
(assessed either directly or through the mean across items) and
actual performance (the percent of correct answers across
items). Appropriate confidence, in this sense, is achieved
when this difference is zero. That is, if well‐calibrated, a
person who expresses 70% confidence in his or her
performance, on average, should answer 70% of the items
correctly. Both of these strategies address what Moore and
Healy (2008) refer to as “overestimation,” reflecting the
degree to which individuals’ perceptions of their own
knowledge (expressed as percent confidence) exceed their
actual knowledge (expressed as the percent of correct
responses across items).
Other literatures have instead focused on the construct
“perceived knowledge,” arguably analogous to confidence in
knowledge, which is typically assessed via one item asking
participants to rate their knowledge on a scale ranging from
“very low” to “very high” (e.g., Jaccard et al., 2005; Lusardi
& Mitchell, 2007). Without translating verbal probability
expressions into numerical probabilities, such rating scales
render it impossible to compute a difference measure of
under/overconfidence, which would require that both overall
confidence and knowledge are expressed on a 0% to 100%
scale. An alternative to this difference measure (as well as
others that rely on ratio‐scaled confidence assessments) is to
instead focus on the degree to which confidence varies
independently of knowledge (see Jaccard et al., 2005; Parker
& Stone, 2010). Although such a measure of the appropri-
ateness of confidence does not allow for a direct comparison
between absolute levels of confidence and knowledge, it is
easily computed using regression techniques. Below, we
will regress a measure of retirement planning onto measures
of both actual financial knowledge and confidence in
that knowledge. The marginal coefficient on confidence
represents the predictive contribution of unjustified variabil-
ity in confidence because confidence is varying indepen-
dently of actual knowledge. This approach also has the
advantage of being computable for confidence assessed
using ordinal verbal scales, as well as numeric subjective
probability scales.
Individual differences in confidence: reliability
and validity
Confidence in knowledge (as well as its appropriateness) has
typically been studied as a consequence of experimental
manipulations targeting difficulty and procedural variables
(see Alba & Hutchinson, 2000, and Yates, 1990, for many
such examples). In contrast to this large experimental liter-
ature, relatively few studies have examined individual differ-
ences in expressions of confidence. Those studies that have
examined individual differences found them to be relatively
stable (Blais, Thompson, & Baranski, 2005; Bornstein &
Zickafoose, 1999; Klayman, Soll, González‐Vallejo, & Barlas,
1999; Stankov & Crawford, 1996, 1997; West & Stanovich,
1997; Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). Overall, studies have
suggested that confidence in knowledge is correlated across
tasks, even when actual knowledge shows weak correlations
across these tasks (e.g., Stankov, 1998; West & Stanovich,
1997). The appropriateness of confidence also varies reliably
with respondent characteristics, with overconfidence being
higher among individuals who are older (Crawford & Stankov,
1996), of lower socioeconomic status (Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007), and have certain psychiatric disorders (Dar,
Rish, Hermesh, Taub, & Fux, 2000; Parker & Fischhoff,
2005) such as pathological gambling (Goodie, 2005).
The appropriateness of confidence also tends to
consistently show modest positive correlations with per-
formance on other decision‐making tasks, suggesting a
“positive manifold” of decision‐making competencies
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005;
Stanovich & West, 2000). Individuals with inappropriate
levels of confidence, as seen in differences in expressed
percent confidence and the percent of accurate responses
across knowledge items, are more likely to exhibit framing
errors and to violate the rules of probability when judging
risks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Overconfidence has
also been related to worse performance in hypothetical
economic tasks, such as trading performance (Biais, Hilton,
Mazurier, & Pouget, 2005) and excess market entry (Camerer
& Lovallo, 1999).
Although previous studies have suggested that confidence
and its appropriateness are related to real‐world outcomes,
they have tended to focus on select decisions made in
specific convenience samples, and most results are specific
to a single method for measuring confidence. Here, we
contribute to the existing literature by examining confidence
and its appropriateness, along with their relationships with
financial decisions related to retirement planning, as faced
by a national sample of US adults. Such financial decisions
are increasingly complex, presumably requiring financial
knowledge and confidence to act on that knowledge.
Participants were recruited through the American Life
Panel (ALP), an Internet panel study of US adults aged
18–91 years. The same panel members completed four
different surveys designed by different researchers, using
different methods to assess knowledge and confidence in
knowledge. As such, these data provide a unique opportunity
to examine the stability of confidence, its relationship to
knowledge, as well as their joint relationships to retirement
planning behavior, across time, domain, and method.
METHOD
Web‐based surveys were conducted with RAND’s ALP,
whose members form a national sample of US adults. They
are recruited from among respondents to the University of
Michigan’s long‐standing Survey of Consumer Attitudes,
who were originally contacted through random‐digit dialing.
Michigan respondents willing to participate in Internet
surveys and giving consent to have their information shared
with RAND were invited to join the ALP. Those without
prior Internet access were offered Web TV to provide such
access. Panel members receive financial compensation for
completing Internet surveys fielded by different researchers,
including economists, sociologists, psychologists, survey
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methodologists, and statisticians. Greater detail is available
at http://www.rand.org/labor/roybalfd/american_life.html.
Sample
We analyzed data from four ALP studies, conducted across a
28‐month period. Each study was conducted on overlapping
subsamples of the full panel, including 566–1150 participants
(Table 1), with 491 respondents completing all four studies.
At the time these studies were conducted, a substantial
number of panel members were on the rolls but never
participated in any survey. After excluding those individuals,
each study had a very high response rate (>90%). Among the
full set of participants who completed at least one the four
studies, ages ranged from 18 to 91 years (mean = 53.0 years),
55.9% were female, and 49.4% had a bachelor’s degree. As
for household family income, 13.7% had less than $25 000,
23.9% had between $25 000 and $49 999, 22.4% had between
$50 000 and $74 999, and 40.0% greater than $75 000
(Table 1).
Measures
The four studies were designed by different researchers, using
different domains and methodologies, thus allowing us to
examine the robustness of results across these approaches (see
Table 2). Study 1, designed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2009),
included 13 true/false questions of financial knowledge, with
overall confidence assessed with a single question assessing
perceived knowledge: “how would you assess your under-
standing of economics” accompanied by a scale ranging from
1 (= very low) to 7 (= very high). Study 2, designed by Parker
and Bruine de Bruin, included a shortened form of the under/
overconfidence instrument designed for the Adult Decision‐
Making Competencemeasure (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). It
consisted of 14 true/false questions measuring general
knowledge (e.g., “alcohol causes dehydration”), with confi-
dence in each answer being assessed on a scale ranging from
50% (= just guessing) to 100% (= absolutely sure). Study 3
was designed by Dominitz, Hung, and Yoong (2009) and
included a hypothetical fee minimization when investing task
that asked respondents to allocate a fixed amount of money
among Standard and Poor 500 index funds. These funds are
designed to track the market, so none were expected to
outperform the others. Hence, performance reflected whether
or not respondents’ allocations minimized fees, the only
distinguishing substantive feature among the funds. The fee‐
minimization‐when‐investing task provides an indirect as-
sessment of knowledge, because in this task it is trivial to
minimize fees once you recognize that is where you should be
focusing. Overall confidence was assessed with a single
question asking “I am very confident that I made the decisions
that would be best for me” followed by a scale ranging from 1
(= disagree strongly) to 5 (= agree strongly). Finally, Study 4
was conducted by Willis and colleagues (Delavande,
Rohwedder, & Willis, 2008; Kimball, 2008; Willis, 2008)
and included 70 true/false questions measuring financial
sophistication (e.g., “Refinancing your home mortgage
Table 1. Description of subsamples in each study
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4
Sample size 1150 1114 1005 566
Field dates May 2006–November 2007 August 2006–November 2007 June 2007–September 2008 July–October 2007
Mean age (range) 53.6 (20–91) 53.4 (18–91) 52.8 (19–91) 54.6 (20–91)
Female (%) 55.4 54.9 56.1 55.6
Bachelor’s degree (%) 49.8 50.1 48.3 48.4
Household income (%)
<$25 000 13.5 13.7 14.6 13.2
$25 000–$49 999 22.6 23.1 24.5 23.5
$50 000–$74 999 22.7 22.2 22.9 22.6
>$75 000 41.2 41.0 38.0 40.7
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(SD= 0.21) (1 = very low;
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Overall Mean = 3.51 0.296***
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Percent correct across 70
true/false items
Mean = 0.74 Item by item Mean = 0.78 0.534***
(SD= 0.10) (100%= surely true;
100%= surely false)
(SD= 0.11)
α = 0.75 α= 0.97
***Two‐sided p< 0.001.
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results in added fees and/or points”), with responses given on
a 12‐point scale. The left side of the scale reflected a belief in
the statement being true, ranging from 100% (= surely true) to
50% (= guess true). On the right side was the mirror image,
ranging from 50% (= guess false) to 100% (= surely false).
Because the response scale includes true and false versions of
50%, responses can be coded onto the half‐range scale used in
Study 2.
At the time of Study 1, respondents also answered three
self‐reports related to retirement planning: (i) “Have you or
your partner ever tried to figure out how your household
would need to save for retirement?” (1 = yes, 0 = no); (ii)
“Have you consulted a financial planner or advisor or an
accountant?” (1 = yes, 0 = no); and (iii) “Have you or your
partner developed a plan for retirement saving?” (1 = yes or
“more or less,” 0 = no). Questions (ii) and (iii) were only
asked if respondents said “yes” to Question (i) and were
coded as 0 if Question (i) was “no.” Because of the logical
dependencies and strong intercorrelations (rs between 0.59
and 0.90, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88), we combined all three
responses into a single mean score (M= 0.46, SD= 0.44),
reflecting a retirement planning index. Given that these
behaviors probably vary with age, we will control for age in
regression analyses below.
Analyses
For each study, we present descriptive statistics for confidence
and knowledge, Cronbach’s alpha to reflect the internal
consistency for each multiple‐item measure of confidence and
knowledge, and the Pearson correlation between confidence
and knowledge. We computed Pearson correlations across
studies (and hence methods) for knowledge and confidence.
For each study, we used linear regression to examine how
confidence predicted the composite measure of self‐reported
retirement planning, after controlling for knowledge. We
favored this characterization of unjustified confidence (pre-
dictive ability of confidence, controlling for knowledge;
Parker & Stone, 2010) over the more common under/
overconfidence score (mean confidence minus percent
correct), both because the latter could not be computed for
Studies 1 and 3 and because of the potential for both con-
fidence and knowledge to be correlated with the dependent
variable in the same direction. Finally, because fee minimi-
zation when investing (Study 3) is arguably a behavioral
outcome of having more knowledge, it is also an appropriate
validation measure. We therefore used logistic regression to
examine whether fee minimization when investing was
predicted by confidence on the other tasks (controlling for
knowledge). To maximize use of the data, parallel cross‐
sectional analyses were run for each study, except where
explicit comparisons were made between studies.
RESULTS
Confidence and knowledge
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the measures of
confidence and knowledge, as well as the correlation among
the two, within each study. Note that for Studies 2 and 4,
confidence and knowledge were assessed on comparable
scales, allowing for the computation of under/overconfidence
scores, reflecting the difference between confidence and
knowledge. In Study 2, respondents were on average 4%
underconfident (0.89–0.93; paired t(1113) = −17.53,
p < 0.001), but in Study 4, they were on average 4%
overconfident (0.78–0.74; paired t(565) = 9.81, p < 0.001),
possibly because of differences in task difficulty (see, e.g.,
Yates, 1990).2 Overall, confidence and knowledge were
significantly and positively correlated with each other,
ranging from 0.30 to 0.53. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha provides
an index of the degree to which items in a scale reflect a
single underlying dimension (or set of highly correlated
dimensions). Five scales in these data include multiple
items, with all showing acceptable levels of Cronbach’s alpha
(0.66–0.97).
Table 3 displays correlations across studies for (i)
knowledge and (ii) confidence. Each correlates positively
across tasks but most strongly where there were similarities
in domain (Studies 1, 3, and 4) or method (Studies 2 and 4).
Relationship between (appropriate) confidence, retirement
planning, and fee minimization when investing
Across all four studies, pairwise correlations between
confidence and the retirement planning index were positive
(r = 0.21, 0.20, 0.19, and 0.26, respectively; all p < 0.001).
As shown in Table 4, confidence predicts retirement
planning even after controlling for actual knowledge as well
as demographic characteristics. Perhaps surprisingly, retire-
ment planning is more probable with increased confidence,
independent of actual knowledge. The demographic char-
acteristics of the participating Internet panel members remain
relatively stable across studies and, hence, show the same
pattern across studies, with more planning for older, more
educated, and wealthier respondents.3
Finally, actual fee minimization on the investment task
from Study 3 was positively correlated with mean
confidence on the three other studies (r = 0.18, 0.15, 0.26;
p < 0.001, for Studies 1, 2, and 4, respectively). As shown in
Table 5, fee minimization was predicted (via logistic
regression) by confidence in Study 4 and was marginally
significant in Study 2, after controlling for knowledge in
each of those studies, respectively. These are both
remarkable because confidence displays a positive correla-
tion with actual behavior, independent of actual knowledge,
and because it does so across quite diverse domains (Study 2
used general knowledge, whereas Study 4 focused on
economic and financial knowledge).
3Because the retirement planning index was a count with limited number of
categories, analyses were repeated using ordinal regression. Results did not
differ qualitatively from those with the linear regressions.
2Because the aggregation across items may mask item‐level error, we also
computed mean Brier scores (Yates, 1990), reflecting the mean squared
error between item‐level confidence and correctness, which had a mean of
0.07 (SD= 0.06) for Study 2 and a mean of 0.21 (SD= 0.06) for Study 4.
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CONCLUSIONS
We present parallel analyses within and across four separate
studies conducted on overlapping subsamples of the national
ALP. The four studies each measured confidence and
knowledge but were implemented by four sets of research-
ers, addressing different research questions at different
points in time and using different methodologies applied to
different domains. As such, the data presented here provide a
unique opportunity to examine confidence’s relationship
with knowledge, its association with retirement planning and
the ability to minimize fees when investing (controlling for
knowledge), and the robustness of these results across
methodologies, domains, and time.
Our main finding is that, contrary to the view of inap-
propriate confidence as a necessarily negative metacognitive
bias, higher confidence (controlling for knowledge) was
correlated with more rather than less prudent behavior—both
retirement planning and fee minimization when investing. In
other words, with the specific behaviors investigated here, it
may be more important to be confident than to be
appropriately confident (i.e., have confidence that corre-
sponds to actual knowledge). One possibility is that these
results are specific to the domain of financial decisions. For
example, confidence may be needed to start the possibly
overwhelming process of retirement planning or even to
make an appointment with a financial planner. Furthermore,
when making such plans, individuals with higher levels of
confidence may be more likely to carefully read through
investment options or make better use of financial planners,
thus making it more likely for them to discover that it is
possible to minimize fees (see, e.g., Delavande et al., 2008).
However, these results are surprising even within the area
of financial decision making, in light of prior results showing
a negative association between overconfidence and successful
trading behavior (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001; Blais
et al., 2005; Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999;
Odean, 1999; Statman et al., 2006). Many of those studies,
however, infer confidence indirectly through individual
characteristics (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2001) or other
behaviors, such as frequency of trading (e.g., Barber &
Odean, 2000; Statman et al., 2006). This raises the possibility






































Table 4. Linear regression of self‐reported retirement planning as a
function of confidence, knowledge, and demographics
Retirement planning
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4
Predictor variables
Confidence 0.10*** 0.08** 0.12*** 0.10*
Knowledge 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.07+
Control variables
Age 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.13***
Female 0.08** 0.01 0.02 0.00
Bachelor’s degree 0.04 0.08** 0.10** 0.06
Income: $25 000–$50 000 0.07* 0.07* 0.10** 0.10**
Income: $50 000–$75 000 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.16***
Income: >$75 000 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.20***
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15
F‐statistic 31.60*** 23.36*** 17.04*** 13.04***
Note: Semipartial correlations, corresponding to the marginal regression





Table 5. Logistic regression of fee minimization when investing as
a function of confidence, knowledge assessed on other tasks, and
demographics
Fee minimization when investing
Study 1 Study 2 Study 4
Predictor variables
Confidence 1.05 1.02+ 1.06***
Knowledge 1.04*** 1.03** 1.08***
Control variables
Age 1.00 1.02** 1.00
Female 0.82 0.60** 0.88
Bachelor’s degree 1.61** 1.96*** 1.25
Income: $25 000–$50 000 0.58+ 0.76 0.56
Income: $50 000–$75 000 0.59+ 0.82 0.49+
Income: >$75 000 0.75 1.29 0.72
Nagelkerke 0.22 0.14 0.28
χ2 statistic 133.37*** 83.85*** 108.69***
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that they are capturing something other than just confidence or
overconfidence (e.g., perhaps, at times, it takes more
confidence to hold steady with an investment portfolio rather
than to engage in more trades). Here, we assess confidence
directly, covarying out directly measured knowledge.4
And whereas we are unaware of results showing
inappropriate confidence in knowledge being associated with
more prudent behavior in other domains, there is reason to
believe that it may sometimes be the case. An analogy might
be made to self‐efficacy and healthy behavior, with self‐
efficacy possibly representing confidence in the ability to
behave in particular ways (e.g., to quit smoking). In theories
of health behavior, self‐efficacy is generally viewed as a
positive set of beliefs, with the general argument that self‐
efficacy frees up an individual to act (Bandura, 1986, 1997).
In this more general sense, confidence may play a role in
reducing hesitation and increasing risk taking. Such effects
may be adaptive in some environments (as seen here) but
may be maladaptive in other environments, such as
adolescent sexual or drug‐use behaviors (Parker & Fischhoff,
2005). Furthermore, we are unaware of research on possible
downsides to unjustified self‐efficacy (or being over‐
self‐efficacious), which might be a valuable line of health‐
behavior inquiry derived from behavioral decision research.
Overall, however, this reinforces the conclusion that
confidence may be an important construct in itself, in terms
of predicting real‐world behavior, even if it is a poor proxy for
actual knowledge or ability.
Our study also provides important insights for the
measurement of individual differences. Where possible to
assess, both confidence and knowledge showed good
internal consistency across items, one form of reliability.
Confidence and knowledge each correlated positively across
the four studies, testifying to the stability of these constructs.
Unlike previous studies, which have found stronger correla-
tions among measures of confidence than among measures
of knowledge (Crawford & Stankov, 1996), levels of
correlation were similar for the two, and in places stronger
for knowledge. Because knowledge on Study 2 is weakly
correlated with the rest, this may be due, in part, to the
shared economic/financial domain of Studies 1, 3, and 4.
Moreover, across all four studies, confidence correlated
positively with knowledge, indicating a degree of metacog-
nitive competence, and one that may be surprising in a
domain like finance and savings where feedback is often
complex, ambiguous, and voluminous. Nevertheless, the
knowledge–confidence correlation was at times only modest,
providing a cautionary note for using confidence as a proxy
for knowledge (i.e., perceived knowledge), as it has been
used in other studies (Park, Mothersbaugh, & Feick, 1994).
A possible conclusion, and one common to behavioral
decision research, is that confidence is an imperfect and
possibly biased reflection of actual knowledge. An alternate
view is that confidence contains at least some predictive
ability untapped by imperfect knowledge tests. That is,
knowledge tests may have omitted topics that are relevant to
the domain and are included in individuals’ perceptions of
their knowledge. This explanation applies most clearly in
tasks where confidence is assessed holistically (as in Studies
1 and 3), and respondent introspection may extend beyond
the specific knowledge items. However, it may even apply to
individual items (as in Studies 2 and 4), if beliefs about
domain knowledge affect individual‐item confidence judg-
ments. Our results do indeed suggest that confidence
provides predictive power, above and beyond actual
knowledge, as seen in predictions of both self‐reported
retirement planning and fee minimization on an experimental
investment task.
This research has several limitations. First, the analyses
are largely cross sectional and correlative in nature, limiting
inferences about causality. And whereas it is tempting to
conclude that greater confidence results in more prudent
investment behavior (whether or not it corresponds to greater
knowledge), stronger methods are needed to take these
findings beyond correlational evidence. Past work has
attempted to manipulate confidence and knowledge (e.g.,
Sieck & Arkes, 2005), but such efforts are largely localized
and unlikely to have broad effects on long‐term planning.
Second, our retirement planning dependent variable is based
on self‐reports, and it is possible that biases in self‐reporting
are correlated with confidence. However, we obtained
similar results with fee minimization when investing, which
is not a self‐report dependent variable, and the diversity of
strategies taken to assess confidence also demonstrates the
robustness of the results. Third, only two behavioral
measures were used in the current analyses, based on data
available in the ALP. In the future, different and stronger
measures of good decision making should be sought to
extend this line of inquiry.
These results also suggest other fruitful research direc-
tions. For example, there is a need to elucidate possible
mechanisms by which greater or lesser confidence could
influence downstream behavior, such as information search
and use, and hesitancy versus willingness to act. Another
research question might address interactions between
individual differences and task characteristics, recognizing
that individuals may react differently to different situations
or in different content domains. Finally, there is a need to
better understand the situations when greater confidence,
controlling for knowledge, corresponds to more adaptive
versus maladaptive behavior.
In closing, the results presented here paint a picture of
inappropriate confidence in knowledge that is more complex
than a simple metacognitive bias. This may be for two
reasons. The first lies in the distinction between good
decision‐making processes and successful decisions (Yates,
1990), such that even if we consider appropriate confidence
a better decision process, it may not always systematically
lead to better outcomes. The second lies in the presence of
multiple, possibly counteracting consequences of confi-
dence, such that negative consequence of this metacognitive
bias may be counteracted by other consequences that are
positive, at least in this domain.
4Blais et al. (2005) do assess confidence directly but use confidence intervals
rather than self‐ratings of knowledge. Because this corresponds more closely
to “overprecision” (Moore & Healy, 2008) and our results focus on
“overestimation,” this distinction may be one source of the differing results.
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